For the actual report and links to other Appendixes click here.
 

Appendix A
Chief Willie Williams' Report

September 22, 1993

The Honorable Lloyd Bentsen
Secretary of the Treasury
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.  20220

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am pleased to submit my comments as an independent reviewer of the Waco
Administrative Review. I have found that the investigative team which you
assembled is of the highest quality and integrity. These men and women have
worked tirelessly to uncover the facts surrounding the events which led up to
and included the raid on David Koresh's residence near Waco, Texas, on the
28th of February 1993.

I arranged my thoughts focusing first on the propriety to investigate Mr.
Koresh, and second on the facts surrounding the probable cause to seek a
Search Warrant and Arrest Warrant. I then moved to the tactical operation on
the 28th of February. My comments address the serious issues of managerial
oversight by both the Treasury Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms. Training is discussed as I conclude my comments by offering
several insights which I believe will help both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms and the Treasury Department continue to serve this country in the
manner we have come to expect.

It has been a pleasure to assist you in this very important undertaking.

Very truly yours,
 
 

[Signed]

WILLIE L. WILLIAMS
Chief of Police
Los Angeles, California

Enclosure

     Report for the Waco Administrative Review

            Independent Reviewer Report
 
 

My first comments go the brave men and women of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (A.T.F.) who were involved in the service of the
Search Warrant at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas. These
federal officers had a difficult task to accomplish if everything in the
plan had worked as designed. The plan unraveled and the raiding party was
ambushed and assaulted with the type of firepower that no municipal or
federal law enforcement agency had ever before experienced.

The men and women in the A.T.F. SRTs, when faced with overwhelming
gunfire, still made every attempt to meet and complete their objective.
Several acts of bravery saved lives and prevented further serious injury
to members of the warrant service teams. All of these agents should be
commended for their actions.

2.   The Special Investigative Team

The team of investigators assembled by the Treasury Department are, in my
opinion, among the most experienced and knowledgeable that one could ask
to conduct such a critical review. I am pleased to report that the
investigative review was conducted with the highest degree of honesty and
integrity.

Mr. Ronald K. Noble, Assistant Secretary (Enforcement) is to be
complimented for his leadership of this review. Mr. Noble has been quite
candid and insisted that no stone be left unturned in the quest for what
occurred in the planning, execution, and recovery after the A.T.F. raid
in Waco, Texas.

   Appropriateness of the investigation of David Koresh

The investigative report is correct when it asserts that A.T.F. had
probable cause to investigate David Koresh for his purchases of huge
amounts of weapons parts, firearms and ammunition. The purchase of many
of these parts was done for an illegal purpose -- that is to assemble
prohibited weapons. It was appropriate to conduct a full investigation
when it became apparent that David Koresh had also unlawfully purchased
AR-15 lower receivers which could be used to convert semi-automatic
rifles into fully automatic weapons similar to M-16 machine guns. This
type of information, coupled with other intelligence, was more than

enough to justify the opening of an investigative case on David Koresh
who resided with others known as the Branch Davidians.

4. Justification to seek Search Warrants and Arrest Warrants

The evidence which the A.T.F. investigators accumulated to justify
seeking either arrest warrants or search warrants was more than
sufficient by January/February 1993.

It was known that Koresh had received M-16 parts which could be used to
convert AR-15 semi-automatic rifles into fully automatic weapons. It had
also been verified that Koresh had purchased AR-15 weapons. When A.T.F.
investigators learned that an arms dealer had intentionally lied to them
and tried to hide the purchase of AR-15 lower receivers by Koresh, this
further strengthened the evidence that Koresh was unlawfully possessing
and manufacturing machine guns or converted fully automatic weapons.

Investigators also had evidence that Koresh had in his possession
gunpowder and other ignition items which, when coupled with the grenade
shells he purchased, gave him the ingredient~s to manufacture live
grenades.

The A.T.F. investigators consulted with the U.S. Attorney's office during
the investigation and did in fact secure a Search Warrant for the Branch
Davidian Compound from a Magistrate Judge.

5. The Tactical Operation of February 28th, 1993

The tactical operation planned by A.T.F. personnel was designed with
several key assumptions being present to ensure a reasonable chance of
success. These critical success factors include the following.

A. Surprise arrival of the A.T.F. SRTs and the inability of the persons
in Koresh's compound to have time to react to the these events. This was
a key critical success factor.

B. Finding most of the men outside and working in the pit area north of
the compound.

C. The quick and successful entry of the compound by designated SRTs and
the separation of persons inside from weapons in the upstairs arms room.

D. Seizing the arms room by surprise entry from outside while the
residents were being detained both outside in the pit area and on the
first floor of the compound.

An examination of the planning for the operation indicates that there is
no copy of the entire raid plan available. It is apparent that the
planners had the raid plan in their heads but never reduced it to
writing. This omission led to a series of later failures by all personnel
involved in the planned operation to have an opportunity to review a
completed plan and question the assumptions. This lack of a completed
written plan also ensured that all those agents who should have had a
clear understanding of what was expected of them and others did not. This
is made very clear when you examine the type of information and direction
given to the agents in the undercover house.

The fact of not having a clear written plan which listed the critical
success factors almost ensured from the start, that when these success
factors began to unravel, no one would grasp the significance of the
unfolding events.

When examined in totality some reviewers agree that the plan was not well
thought-out. The reasons include: no provision for contingencies; a less
than adequate command and control of the SRTs and their support units;
the failure to design-an intelligence system which gathered all pieces of
data and provided an analysis of this information; the failure of
adequate oversight from senior A.T.F. management and the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Enforcement; and insufficient reserve
personnel available or enough first aid and medical support on site.

After reviewing interviews conducted with A.T.F. personnel who planned
the raid on February 28th, and all of those who had support or other
roles in the planning, it is my belief that the planners never thought
about, nor planned for a partial or full failure of the operation. This,
in my opinion, is one of the greatest failures of management in A.T.F.

6.   Management Oversight - Structural Deficiencies

The management oversight responsibilities between the Treasury Department
and A.T.F. must be re-examined. At the time of the Waco raid on February
28th, 1993, there was no written policy delineating areas of
responsibility that for example, required A.T.F. to notify anyone in the
Treasury Department that A.T.F. was planning, or about to implement a
raid such as the one planned and executed on February 28th. There was no
policy that required the notification of the Treasury Department when an
investigation of the magnitude of this one was contemplated or had
already begun.

The lack of active oversight by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Enforcement, Treasury Department, was one reason that there was no early
notification by A.T.F. of the Waco raid. The fact that this was the same
policy for several years only magnifies the problem. The investigative
report correctly points out that had oversight taken place, many
questions which needed to be asked may have come up much earlier.

The investigative report correctly states that had the Office of
Enforcement been involved in the early planning stages, its intervention
might have led the planners to reevaluate the faulty factual assumptions
on which they had relied. This failure contributed to a condition where
little or no analysis of intelligence information was made by those at
A.T.F. headquarters or at the Treasury Department.

The understanding of the importance of intelligence and the operational
decisions which were being built around these assumptions was inadequate
at nearly every level of ATF's management from the command personnel in
Texas who planned and executed the raid, to personnel at the National
Command Center to-the leadership at A.T.F. Headquarters. Moreover,
because such matters were outside the scope of the Office of
Enforcement's defined responsibilities, the office did not have an
adequate opportunity to rigorously scrutinize these matters.

7.   Training Issues

This report points out several areas where training is needed in areas
such as command and control decision-making. Training is needed at all
levels on the importance of understanding what is meant by intelligence
gathering, how to analyze it and most importantly how to build a tactical
operation around the facts and assumptions based on an investigation and
the intelligence gathered. It is very apparent that senior managers in
A.T.F. need advanced training in Media Relations. This investigation
shows that the A.T.F. leaders in Texas never successfully managed the
growing interest by the media in both the Branch Davidians and the
escalating activities by A.T.F. personnel in and around Waco, Texas.

Training is required to ensure that all members of A.T.F., particularly
field supervisors, have the requisite skills necessary to plan and
execute an investigation and operation such as the raid on the compound
of David Koresh.

I will not go into detail about all of the other training issues, but they
include command and control skills for SRT operations and particularly the SRT
team leaders. Training must include how to set up an undercover operation and
what is expected of the undercover operatives. In this case, the agents in the
undercover house were never given a clear mission. The agents in the
undercover house as an example, were never told of the raid planners'
assumption that the men in the compound would be outside when the raid began.
 

CONCLUDING COMMENTS:

I was asked to be an independent reviewer of the work product of the Waco
Administrative Review Team's report to the Secretary of Treasury.

The investigation team conducted an exhaustive and thorough review of the
events which led up to the raid on February 28th. The investigative team's
report also offers clear and factual analysis of the events as they unfolded
and what caused the plan to disintegrate as the first SRT personnel alighted
from the cattle trailers.

The investigative report appropriately identifies improper planning and offers
guidance to help ensure that A.T.F. does not repeat the same errors in the
future.

I would recommend that upon review of the investigative report and each of the
Independent Reviewers' Reports, that the following should be undertaken.

1. New procedures must be put in place to ensure appropriate oversight by the
Department of Treasury with each of its subordinate agencies.

2. The Director of A.T.F. and the other senior managers in headquarters must
take a more active role in oversight of field operations, especially when they
are potentially of the magnitude of the David Koresh investigation.

3. A.T.F. must examine its goals and objectives and determine what type of
enforcement role it is going to require its agents to fulfill. Once that role
is determined then it is the responsibility of both A.T.F. and the Treasury
Department to ensure that the employees receive the training necessary to meet
the objectives of the organization.

Expert Reports
 
 
 

Tactical Operations Experts
(alphabetically by author)

Wade Y. Ishimoto
John A. Kolman
George Morrison
John J. Murphy
Rod Paschall
Robert A. Sobocienski
 

                        AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT
               OF THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS

            RAID OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN COMPOUND IN WACO, TEXAS

                               PREPARED BY:
                      Wade Y. Ishimoto, Consultant

                    FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
                              August 16, 1993
 
 
 

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS
 

        Executive Summary ....................................                       B-9
        I. Introduction.......................................                       B-11
        II. Command and Control...............................                       B-11
        III. Intelligence.......................................                     B-17
        IV. Operations Security ..............................                       B-21
        V. Training and Exercises ............................                       B-22
        VI. Support Operations ...............................                       B-23
        VII. Weaponry, Armament, and Other Equipment .........                       B-27
        VIII.Concluding Remarks ................................                     B-28
 
 

                                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 

This Executive Summary is prepared in response to the major concerns raised during my tenure on the
Department of Treasury's Waco Review team. My remarks represent independent analysis, and that analysis is
found in the body of this report. The body of the report also addresses a number of potential improvements
which are not discussed in this Executive Summary.

I. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) raid plan, as conceived, had a reasonable chance of
success.

II. The critical success factors for the raid plan were not necessarily recognized nor understood by the leaders
of the ATF operation because of inexperience or lack of training. The leaders I refer to extend from the Special
Response Team (SRT) Leaders all the way to the ATF Director. These critical success factors were:

a. Surprise consisting specifically of:

          (1) Insufficient advance warning of the impending raid to allow cult members to arm and deploy.

          (2) The Branch Davidians not understanding the significance of the trucks/cattle trailers until these
vehicles were at least at the intersection of the compound road and Double EE Ranch Road which would have
provided about 30 to 45 seconds of advance warning. The Branch Davidians would have found it difficult to arm
and deploy themselves in the manner witnessed during the actual execution of the search and arrest warrants.

     b. Isolation of the majority of the cult's weapons and ammunition from cult members through seizure of the
arms room located next to Vernon Howell's living quarters.

     c. Successful entry by the ATF SRTs through the front door of the compound which was critical to
separating cult members from the bulk of their weapons in the arms room.

     d. Finding the men in the compound working in the outdoor (excavated pit or underground) area to the
North of the compound.

III. The reason for the raid's failure is directly attributable to the fact that the critical success factors defined
in II. above were, at best, only partially achieved. The fact that the cult members were armed and deployed as
ATF deployed from their cattle trailers is particularly relevant.

IV. When viewed in totality, the raid plan was not well conceived regardless of my opinion that it had a
reasonable chance of success. The plan did not provide for contingencies, lacked depth, and did not provide
adequate command and control of support and tactical forces. My assessment is that the SRTs possessed the
minimal amount of training and experience to meet the raid's objectives. However, in an operation of this
magnitude, the SRTs require equally well-

trained and experienced command, control, and support personnel. These personnel lacked a requisite amount
of training and experience.

V. Other factors that contributed to the subsequent loss of life and failure to complete the mission include:

a. A complex command, control, and communications mechanism.

b. Less than adequate training in a number of different areas.

c. An intelligence system which was weak.

d. A lack of well-developed Operations Security (OPSEC) policy and procedures.

e. Equipment limitations.

f. Task organization that principally centered on SRT actions.

g. A lack of reserve forces.

h. A plan that was not developed in-depth to include contingency actions.

These and other factors pertinent to future success are discussed in the main body of this report.

VI. Key Recommendations and Findings:

     a. ATF will require a future and continuing SRT capability as long as that organization continues to have an
enforcement versus compliance-only mission.

     b. Improvements are required in policy and procedural guidance pertinent to high risk operations requiring
the use of ATF SRTs. This guidance must include command and control matters, technical support
(communications and surveillance), investigative techniques to include electronic monitoring, intelligence in
support of tactical operations, reorganization of SRTs to include Forward Observers, media relations, OPSEC,
use of the military, equipment to include armament, and training.

     c. The key to success in raid operations, no matter how large or small, always resides in the field and with
field personnel. The actions of ATF Headquarters personnel on February 28, 1993, did not significantly
contribute to the success or failure of the mission. The proper role for ATF Headquarters is one of planning
oversight, plan approval, and resource allocation prior to execution of the operation. All parties must
strenuously avoid trying to run a field operation from a headquarters location with subsequent
micro-management and loss of decisive action and decision-making in the field.

I. INTRODUCTION

The missions of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) bring the men and women of this agency
face-to-face with a wide variety of criminal adversaries. The very nature of the laws they must enforce in the
firearms and explosives arena virtually ensures that ATF agents are subject to life-threatening situations in a
high percentage of their operations. They are also subject to a great deal of public criticism from special
interest groups who are particularly vociferous over ATF enforcement of firearms statutes.

During the last decade and a half, ATF's mission has expanded to meet greater criminal sophistication in the
use of explosives and firearms. Explosive attacks have always been a favored tactic of those who wish to
terrorize the public; and the use of automatic weapons has also become much more prevalent in the execution
of crimes.

I respect the difficulty of the ATF mission along with the dedication and bravery of their personnel. The death
of four agents and the wounding of sixteen in one action is unprecedented in American law enforcement.
After-the-fact criticism and "Monday-morning quarterbacking" are very easy traps to fall into and made
preparation of this report difficult.

However, my review of the Branch Davidian event detects a very definite need to provide ATF personnel with
additional tools to allow them to better deal with situations like they faced in Waco, Texas. These tools include
more defined policy in some areas, the need for written procedural references, training, and some equipment. I
attempt to avoid individual criticism as that is a matter best left to Department of Treasury personnel.
Unfortunately, my analysis also discovers some questionable individual performance; and I would be remiss not
to discuss these possible shortcomings.

II. COMMAND AND CONTROL

    A. ATF Headquarters

          1. Concerns over the role of ATF Headquarters in commanding and controlling large raid
operations are expressed by members of Congress, Treasury officials, and by ATF personnel at all levels.
These concerns evolve around possible poor performance and future roles for ATF headquarters personnel.

               a. I believe the overall performance of ATF Headquarters in command and control of the
Waco raid was adequate except in the area of providing pre-raid support to the field. The
headquarters role included plan review and approval, provision of oversight (e.g., asking of questions pertinent
to the investigation and need for a raid, and involvement of the Special Operations Division), and provision of
support.

               b. There are two matters which I believe are worthy of further inquiry. The first is whether
the raid could have been conducted earlier in February and the second concerns procedures to obtain military
support.

With respect to the possibility of conducting the raid earlier in February, there are reports that the Houston
office proposed conducting the raid a week before February 28, 1993. This meeting was supposedly postponed
because some key Headquarters personnel were unavailable. This implies that the raid could have occurred
prior to publication of the Waco Tribune article and any subsequent rise in awareness or paranoia by the
Branch Davidians. This is speculation but is worthy of additional inquiry to determine whether there is a
need to improve ATF policy and procedures with respect to approval of an operation.

Based on my review, I am not confident that ATF Headquarters understands and has appropriate
policy to obtain military support for large-scale operations. The ATF Military Liaison Officer appears
to be assigned from the Office of the Department of Defense (DOD) Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy
and Support. Interviews indicate that statements were made by the Military Liaison Officer that
narcotics-related activity was needed to justify military support. If true, those statements are contrary to
existing DOD policy which permits support to law enforcement on a reimbursable basis. The alleged Branch
Davidian narcotics activity was tenuous, at best, and subjected ATF to intense scrutiny by Congress. In
addition, the Special Operations Branch Chief does not appear to understand how military support is obtained.
This is unacceptable since the Military Liaison Officer works for the Branch Chief and proper oversight cannot
occur unless the Branch Chief has a better understanding of this matter. Finally, field personnel also appear to
only understand how to obtain military support through narcotics-related activity.

               c. Other headquarters shortfalls include a policy which limits the firepower available to the
field; limited ability to provide intelligence support; a lack of understanding of electronic surveillance
operations; and not providing additional technical support to the field.

               d. Over-reaction to the proper role of ATF Headquarters in command and control of
future operations must be avoided. Studious attempts must be made to avoid micro-management and the
accompanying deleterious effect it will have on decisive action and decision-making in the field. The key to
success in raid operations resides in the field and with field personnel. I believe that the proper role for ATF
Headquarters is planning oversight, plan approval and resource allocation prior to the conduct of an operation.

Recommendations:

Existing ATF policy and procedures should be reviewed to ensure that streamlined plan approval with
appropriate oversight will occur in the future.

Military support policy should be fully documented and either included or referred to in the National Response
Plan for ATF.

The policy on electronic surveillance should be reviewed and consideration given to improving ATF capabilities
to include possible augmentation of field personnel from headquarters. (Note: The FBI has had a long-standing
plan and capability to augment their Field Divisions during crisis situations.)

The ATF National Response Plan should be modified to better define the role of ATF Headquarters and their
field organizations.

          2. The National Response Plan (NRP) provides a basis for planning any future operation of the
magnitude encountered in Waco.

               a. A very necessary first step towards a mature planning process was taken with the creation of the
NRP. As in any initial endeavor, the NRP can be improved.

               b. The NRP, as currently written, is a combination of a Headquarters policy document along with
providing a variety of procedural guidance. Some of the procedural guidance is quite detailed (e.g., the logistical
support officer being responsible for obtaining water) while some of it does not address important concepts. For
example, there is no conceptual guidance concerning command post operation and selection of a command post
location.

               c. Recommendations:

The NRP should be reviewed and modified in light of the Waco incident.

The military model of a stand-alone policy document (e.g., a Department of Army Regulation) with separate
implementation and procedural guidance (e.g., Field Manuals) should be considered versus one all-encompassing
document.

Implementation and procedural guidance should be expanded and training in the NRP conducted for anyone
that is an ATF supervisor.
 

    B. Field Command, Control, and Planning

          1. The Command, Control, and Communications mechanism for the raid was complex, and a
comprehensive understanding of roles and missions for the organization was not evident.

               a. At the individual SRT level (e.g., Houston) command, control, and communications was
established in an adequate manner except for two matters. First, it is not evident that a chain of command
within the individual SRTs was established to provide for leadership succession in the event that the leader
became disabled. Secondly, the Forward Observers did not appear to be in direct support of a specific team and
the teams could not directly communicate with the Forward Observers. The Forward Observers provide a
means of

both information/intelligence and "heavy" fire support (i.e., rifles) which may be used as an essential element of
a raid or to assist in contingency situations.

               b. The chain of command and specific role for the Forward Observers was not clear. The interviews
of the Forward Observers reflect this observation and the fact that they had different understandings of their
rules of engagement and to whom they were responsive. The military would describe the Forward Observer
role on the raid as being in General Support of the operation versus Direct Support (e.g., directed to support a
specific SRT). Both concepts have their merits, but a direct support role is generally favored for raid
operations. The net result on the Waco raid was that the Forward Observers were not positioned
advantageously (i.e., to provide adequate coverage of the compound in a timely manner) and could have been
used more effectively in an information gathering role (e.g., determining whether compound members were
deployed or working in the pit area).

               c. The focus on command and control was on the SRTs. I believe that the same statement applies to
planning matters. The coordination of other agencies appeared to be in the hands of one individual, Phil Lewis,
at the Texas State Technical College (TSTC) Command Post (CP). He performed admirably, but the system
and process should provide for better coordination of activities with outside agencies and more than one
individual from ATF tasked with this responsibility.

               d. The TSTC CP did not function well. The Incident Commander was airborne and was therefore
less able to command and control activities. There did not appear to be an adequate means of providing status
information to other agencies from the CP, much less to ATF personnel. Roles and missions were not
adequately stated to these staffmembers. These observations reflect the need for policy and procedural
guidance along with training of personnel.

               e. The equivalent of a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was not established. Whereas field CPs
normally concentrate on interagency coordination and overall command and control, a TOC focuses on the
tactical aspects of the operation. In a TOC, Forward Observer information may be consolidated and analyzed,
reserve forces deployed and coordinated (these were not available at Waco except from outside agencies),
negotiations with suspects conducted (this was a happenstance), and other matters directly important to the
success of the tactical mission coordinated and controlled. The TOC needs to be staffed with personnel who
have defined roles and responsibilities. The Tactical Coordinator may choose to operate from a TOC or, as was
the case at Waco, forward with the SRTs. The Undercover (U/C) house was suitable as a TOC and had some
TOC type functions under ASAC Cavanaugh, but in reality did not contain the staffing nor the planning of a
true TOC. One of the advantages of commanding from a TOC was evident when Cavanaugh became the person
most able to coordinate tactical activities versus ASAC Sarabyn who was pinned down in a firefight. The
Tactical Coordinator unfortunately chose a position where he was at the forward edge of the battle and less
able to command and control the SRTs...I believe this illustrates the need for better procedural guidance and
training versus individual negligence on the part of Sarabyn.

               f. The plan was developed principally by SRT personnel whose focus was primarily in actions at the
compound. My observation is that they could have benefitted from trained staffplanning assistance. This is
especially true in intelligence support which is addressed later in this report.

               g. ATF personnel (possibly due to inexperience coupled with policy and procedural guidance gaps)
sought advice, guidance, and assistance from persons and agencies who were not the best qualified to provide
such help. This comment is particularly pointed at the manner in which military support was obtained. For
example, there are reports that ATF went to Operation Alliance (a counter-narcotics related organizational
grouping) to request military support. The ATF Headquarters Military Liaison Officer could have gone through
the Department of Defense (DOD) Director of Military Support (DOMS) organization to obtain more complete
military support. In another example, ATF appeared to be ill-advised by a member of the Texas Governor's
staff to use the Texas National Guard for various operations with a strong implication that such support could
be provided for free if there were a narcotics relationship...tenuous at best. A third example is the use of a
Special Forces Communications NCO to design and "approve" the communications network. Additional
observations on military support are found in other sections of this report.

          2. Inexperience in crisis management and operational planning skills for a large scale operation such as
Waco was clearly evident in the planning and execution of the raid. The lack of a written operations order is
one indication of this inexperience. Other examples include:

               a. The lack of in-depth planning for contingencies as witnessed by the lack of an alternative means
of entry should the first fail; and an "Oh shit" plan consisting of running away from the compound rather than
using supporting fire and maneuver or the use of armored vehicles to provide cover and to recover personnel.

               b. The briefings that I observed on videotape (one at Fort Hood and one in Waco) are reflective of
this inexperience. The briefings rambled instead of focusing on key issues and presenting information
succinctly.

               c. The lack of a functional staff (no matter how reduced in size) at a TOC location or in the CP are
also indicative of inexperience, the need for more training, and the need for additional procedural guidance on
command and control matters.

               d. The lack of depth in the communications plan, undercover house operation, the medical plan, and
media plan are also indicative of inexperience.

               e. The failure to conduct the Mag Bag raid resulted in a fire fight and additional actions to
apprehend suspects. These actions would not have been necessary if the plan to raid the Mag Bag had been
executed as planned.

          3. The number of courses of action and tactical options available to ATF were limited because of
limitations on equipment, training, experience, and policy along with the presence of presumably innocent
children and females.

               a. Equipment considerations are discussed elsewhere in this report and include the paucity of night
vision equipment, technical surveillance equipment, and restrictions on weaponry. The decision to follow the
advice of a member of the Texas Governor's staff may have caused problems with ATF not receiving better
helicopter capability and armored vehicles. Going through the military's DOMS mechanism for military support
rather than Operation Alliance and Joint Task Force (JTF) 6 might have made a difference in ATF getting
smoke generating devices, armored vehicles, and other assistance.

               b. Training and experience gaps are reflected throughout this report. The training gaps can be
remedied and, if done properly, can make up for the lack of experience. Training is addressed in greater detail
elsewhere in this report.

               c. Policy limitations which impacted on the operation included restrictions on weaponry, restrictions
on chemical agents and distraction devices, uncertainty over electronic surveillance issues, and failure of policy
to address the provision of military support through the DOMS organization.

          4. The raid plan lacked depth and did not provide for adequate consideration of contingencies.
Improvement in these matters can be attained through additional training and the development of doctrinal
guidance (e.g., reference manuals and checklists on SRT operations).

          5. There are feelings that the ATF Incident Commander and other key leaders in the ATF chain should
be limited to those from SRT ranks. My belief is that will not prove adequate. This belief is based on a general
need for additional training in crisis management procedures and operational planning which are not
well-developed at any level within ATF. I do agree that SACs and ASACs should at least attend the SRT
courses as observers to enhance their knowledge and that they should also receive additional training on crisis
management and planning.

          6. Recommendations: The observations listed above are reflective of ATF's relative lack of experience
in command and control of operations of the magnitude seen in Waco. Policy needs to be established,
procedural guidance provided in writing, and strenuous training provided to personnel at all levels who may
become involved in these kinds of operations in the future. If ATF or the Department of Treasury cannot
provide the resources to pursue doctrinal development and training, then serious consideration must be given
to limiting the scope of ATF tactical operations.

III. INTELLIGENCE

    A. Organization

          1. The ATF organization to provide intelligence support during the investigative and operational (raid)
phases was not effective.

               a. Intelligence analytical support did not effectively bridge the gap between the investigative support
mission and tactical support. Analysis appeared to be a function of different individuals (e.g., the Case Agent,
RAC Buford, ASAC Sarabyn, etc.) rather than a function of a defined system and process. There was no clear
focal point where all intelligence flowed and was fully analyzed and subsequently delivered to the tactical
planners.

               b. There were numerous instances of assumptions being made on the basis of incomplete, dated, or
overstated information which adversely influenced operational planning. For example:

The number of people in the compound was estimated at 75, a 25% error. The surveillance logs and interviews
of former cult members did not substantiate the 75 person figure. Therefore, I question how those numbers
were derived.

The U/C Agent had about eight limited visits into the compound. Yet there were those that felt he had
continuing access and gave more credence to his information than was true.

Information on the physical structure of the compound was a composite of a few visits by the U/Cs and
information from unvetted sources that was a year old in some cases.

               c. A number of incorrect assumptions could have been put into proper perspective if there were
trained, experienced personnel working within a defined organizational structure to conduct in-depth
intelligence analysis.

          2. The existing intelligence structure does not tie all-source intelligence (e.g., technical surveillance,
U/Cs, Forward Observers, aerial photography) together in a systematic fashion. Overall intelligence collection
and planning is not centrally managed. Analysis occurs in pockets rather than through a capable, defined
organizational structure; and dissemination of intelligence (the product of recording, evaluation, and
interpretation. . .i.e., analysis of information) versus raw information is not consistent with proven techniques
used by other organizations.

          3 . The organization of the U/C house and its activities was marked by no clear chain of command or
direction of their actions. The rapid establishment of the U/C operation is commendable, but poor organization
neutralized what could have been a major source of intelligence and confirmation that the Branch Davidians
were waiting in ambush.

    B. Intelligence Operations

          1. General Comments: The remainder of this section is organized into a discussion of typical
intelligence operations disciplines: Intelligence Liaison activities; Human Intelligence operations (to include
undercover activities); Imagery Intelligence (including aerial intelligence collection, photographic and video
collection); and Electronic Intelligence.

Intelligence Liaison:

               a. It appears that ATF worked closely with McClennan County law enforcement officials to obtain
intelligence about the Branch Davidian organization, its operations, and its physical facilities (i.e., the Mag Bag
and the Mount Carmel compound). This interface was, in my opinion, highly useful in the investigative and
tactical planning phases of the operation. Unfortunately, there was limited information available from this
source. Also to its credit, ATF exploited information and sources available from the Texas Human Resources
Department and the Texas Department of Public Safety. With the latter organization, it is not clear whether
all aspects of information and intelligence were explored...i.e., Criminal Intelligence, Narcotics, Texas Rangers.

               b. Various interviews indicate that ATF attempted to obtain information available from Interpol,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the El Paso Intelligence Center (through Operation Alliance). I
found only one approach to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, no attempts to obtain information from the
Customs Service, and none through the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency. Since there were
foreign nationals in the compound, inquiries should have been made of these agencies whether intelligence was
available or not. I sense, but cannot substantiate, that interagency rivalry coupled with inexperience may have
led to this incomplete search for information.

               c. Recommendation: ATF should review its policy and procedures to obtain intelligence from
other agencies and provide guidance to their field organizations and headquarters personnel on that matter.

3 . Human Intelligence:

               a. My previous discussion of the lack of central control of intelligence planning and collection also
applies to ATF's human intelligence operations. Central control of policy should be established at ATF
headquarters along with national Intelligence Community interfaces. However, the field organization must be
able to control intelligence operations in support of tactical operations.

               b. There were several successes in human intelligence operations to include information obtained
from United Parcel Service personnel, the use of a U/C to obtain physical information about the Mag Bag and
one trip into the Mount Carmel compound, the recruitment of the Double EE Ranch owner, and the
information gleaned from former cult members by the Case Agent, RAC Buford, and others.
 
 

               c. The interview of the former cult members posed a difficult problem in terms of determining their
reliability and accuracy of information. Again, a system was not in place to pool information coming from these
sources, to fully analyze it, and to disseminate the resulting intelligence in a useful way to tactical and support
personnel.

               d. The U/C house operation was an excellent idea which did not pay high dividends because of a lack
of organization, proper tasking, and supervision of their activities. The logs which I reviewed were incomplete
and do not substantiate many of the assumptions which were made on activity in the compound. For example,
the tactical planners were adamant that a "routine" was evident in the compound with the males working
outside at 10:00 AM onwards...logs from the U/C house do not corroborate this assumption. At best, the U/C
house operation resulted in limited information about the physical structure, incomplete observation of
activities, and information about a few of the personnel inside the compound. The U/C house operation was
capable, in my opinion, of providing much more intelligence. One of the supposed goals of the U/C house was to
obtain additional information on probable cause for a search or arrest warrant...it is not evident to me that this
occurred.

              e. The Forward Observers were not effectively used and a TOC was not in place to exploit
information coming from the Forward Observers. The lack of effectiveness in this event refers to gaps in
tasking, limited deployment around the compound, lateness of deployment, and the provision of extremely
limited amounts of collection devices to the Forward Observers.

               f. Recommendations:

Without access to all ATF policy, procedural guidance, and training information for intelligence, I am not able to
make detailed recommendations on improvement of human intelligence operations. I therefore recommend that
ATF or an outside organization conduct a more in-depth review of intelligence operations to determine whether
there is need for changes/additions to policy, procedure, and training.

4. Imagery Intelligence:

               a. In-house ATF capabilities to collect and process imagery intelligence appear extremely limited.
There are references to a (i.e., only one) 35mm camera in the U/C house, a pole camera which did not work
very well and was positioned poorly (both physically and in terms of how permission was obtained to install it),
poor intelligence analysis and posting of information from the U/C house photographic operations, and little or
no use of night vision equipment with video or photographic capability.

               b. ATF capability to collect aerial imagery intelligence appears to be very limited. ATF turned to
both Customs and the Texas National Guard for support in these areas. I do not find strong evidence that the
ability to plan and collect imagery intelligence using aerial platforms was well planned or directed by ATF. The
offer by a member of the Texas Governor's Office to overfly the compound and to use relatively
unsophisticated Forward Looking Infrared

Radar (FLIR) to obtain information does not give me a great deal of confidence in the knowledge of system
capabilities by either ATF personnel or the person who offered that advice to ATF.

               c. I do not believe shortcomings in imagery intelligence had a direct bearing on the failure of the
raid. However, these shortcomings in knowledge, planning, and equipment capabilities do not bode well in the
future if ATF must engage in raid operations against adversaries of similar or greater levels of sophistication as
the Branch Davidians.

               d. Recommendations:

ATF should improve their ability to manage the collection, processing, and dissemination of imagery
intelligence; increase their knowledge of existing capabilities available from other Federal agencies; and develop
methods to obtain proper support from those agencies.

ATF should also review their in-house capabilities and determine whether there were performance problems
with cameras and video equipment (rectifiable through training), or policy and procedural gaps, or gaps caused
by inadequate equipment.

5. Electronic Intelligence:

               a. Electronic intelligence operations suffered because of poor management and equipment
limitations. In hindsight, increased electronic intelligence capability (e.g., Title III installation on telephones or
listening devices within the compound) might have provided information on whether the raid was compromised.

               b. There are a number of conflicting statements from ATF personnel concerning why a full Title III
installation (much less a Pen Register) was never pursued. This indicates misunderstanding on the part of ATF
personnel. A current ATF Order provides adequate guidance for Title III surveillance, but senior ATF
personnel did not appear to understand this. In addition, there are conflicting statements on whether a scanner
in the U/C house was operating or whether U/C personnel knew how to use the equipment.

               c. Recommendation:

ATF should review its electronic intelligence equipment, policy, procedures, and training for inadequacies.
Reduced electronic intelligence capability affects their ability to conduct very sophisticated operations in a world
where criminal adversaries have demonstrated increased counterintelligence capabilities.

 IV. OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)

A. Policy and Procedural Guidance:

          1. It is not clear to me that ATF has published OPSEC policy and procedural guidance, or provided
appropriate OPSEC training to its personnel.

          2. Recommendation: Review and provide such guidance with accompanying training at all levels of
the organization.

B. OPSEC Planning and Execution:

          1. OPSEC operations are not easy to plan nor execute. There are always trade offs in an open society
and in an environment where it is difficult for ATF to divert personnel from on-going cases and other missions.
The key ingredient to OPSEC success is to systematically plan, understand the risks involved, and then decide
on actions based on the risk. Proper planning and execution of OPSEC measures requires appropriate policy,
documented procedural guidance, and training. I did not find these ingredients for OPSEC success within
ATF's Waco operation.

          2. There were numerous chances for compromise of the operation through inadvertent disclosure. These
include the Command Post opening days before the operation began and its location in a semi-secured area; the
selection of the U/C house and the manner in which U/C operations were conducted; the pole camera
operation; the training at Fort Hood; the need to involve other agencies, etc. ATF attempted to strike a
reasonable balance between security and OPSEC measures, but it did not appear that OPSEC was centrally
planned nor managed. OPSEC and other security practices appeared to occur as a happenstance and as a result
of individual intuition rather than being deliberately planned and orchestrated.

          3. Current resource allocation does not allow ATF to be self-sufficient and in total control of all
operations subject to security and OPSEC measures. The United States military establishment comes close to
self-sufficiency only in a combat environment, but Federal law enforcement agencies do not have that
advantage. These comments should not be construed to be in support of self-sufficiency. I mention this
phenomena only to illustrate that there will always be risks for compromise even when the operation may be
totally self-contained. These risks must be managed, and some risks must be taken on any operation.

               On the assumption that ATF will examine and strengthen their security and OPSEC policy,
procedures and training, ATF should include measures to deal with the risks posed by a number of activities to
include: Was an open-stance with the media was in the best interests of ATF? Would bus transportation have
been better versus the car convoy on the morning of the 28th? Was backstopping of the U/Cs enrolled as TSTC
students sufficient?

          4. Recommendation: ATF should develop additional policy and procedural guidance and provide
different levels of training to all personnel on security and OPSEC measures

applicable to various operations. Different levels of training refer to the fact that at the entry level, personnel
should be provided with reasons and basic methodology while at the journeyman and above level the emphasis
should be on planning for security and OPSEC.

V. TRAINING AND EXERCISES

A. General Comments:

          1. I identify numerous potential training needs throughout this report. ATF has identified their training
needs and instituted considerable training already. However, in the vein of continuous improvement and in the
wake of deficiencies identified in my review, there is a need to expand those training efforts. I also suggest that
ATF expand their efforts to determine "best-in class" processes to achieve specific training goals. For example,
mention was made of using a one to two week seminar by a private organization to achieve executive level
training in crisis management. I submit that this would not be an example of a best-in-class process. Those
areas which I identify as definitely needing training improvement include:

Advanced SRT training Forward Observer training Intelligence Operations (management, analysis, intelligence
in support of tactical operations) Command and Control

          3. There are other areas which may require additional training but where I am not clear as to whether
they represent performance problems or the need for more training. These include:

Intelligence Analysis and Operations during the Investigative Phase. U/C Operations. Technical Support
Operations.
? Media Relations.

B. Improved Sophistication of Training Management:

          1. Overall, the Lesson Plans and training design which I reviewed do NOT reflect a high level of
sophistication in training management. For example, most SRT lesson plans do not use performance-oriented,
measurable objectives. Improvements are needed in what is to be learned and how it is to be measured to
ensure that the learning has occurred

          2. Significant gaps exist in the completeness of all training. For example, the proposed Forward
Observer Course syllabus only devotes two hours towards observation and recording skills and no time towards
establishment of a command and control mechanism and TOC for the Forward Observer.

          3. SRT Basic training does NOT result in a skilled team member, team leader, or in any other
particular skill. The SRT course appears to be delivered as an overview of most skills found on a Special
Response Team. The current training could be viewed as being barely adequate for small-scale operations;
however, if ATF is to continue with the mission of tackling adversarial groups which require the use of multiple
SRTs, more sophisticated training is required to help ensure success. At a very minimum, additional training is
required in command and control skills for SRT operations.

To also improve, ATF should carefully review the usefulness of specific instructional blocks to their course
objectives. For example, the SRT Course includes time for physical training. Rhetorically, should physical
training be a pre-requisite for attendance and the time better spent on practical exercises designed to reinforce
entry team skills and techniques? Physical fitness in a realist situation could be demonstrated in these
exercises.

          4. Very importantly, it was suggested that crisis management skills could be learned by attending an
IACP seminar on crisis management. This is absolutely the wrong approach. ATF must develop its own
in-house training for these important skills and teach current ATF policy and procedures, thereby making the
training specific to ATF's needs. This type of training must also include extensive practical exercises to further
the learning and retention of those skills that are taught. "Best-in-class" benchmarking would show that the U.
S. Army presents command and control skills during Basic Officer Training, Advanced Officer Training,
Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. I do not have the exact time spent on
command and control matters in those four courses, but a rudimentary estimate would be that the training is
months long.

C. Exercises:

          1. Individual and small group training activities must be expanded to include periodic exercises to hone
and evaluate preparedness. This is missing from the training program within ATF.

          2. Exercises should studiously avoid becoming a vehicle to learn new skills. Instead, exercises should be
used to evaluate and verify preparedness to conduct specific missions. The learning of new skills is most
conducive to other training endeavors.

VI. SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A. Military Support:

          1. It appears that there are several performance related problems associated with ATF's acquisition of
military support. The ATF Headquarters Military Liaison Officer was quoted as saying there needed to be drug
activity to justify military support. This is simply not true. Perhaps he meant that drug activity was needed to
justify non-reimbursable military support, but that is an exceedingly poor reason (i.e., non-reimbursement) to
seek military support of law enforcement for ATF.

An ATF Headquarters manager to whom the Military Liaison Officer reports stated that he was not aware of
how military support was obtained and that he trusted the Military Liaison Officer to do what was right. I do
not accept that as good management practice because the manner in which military support may be obtained
by Federal law enforcement agencies is not complicated and should be known by all ATF Supervisors.

          2. The reliance on Operation Alliance as a main source of obtaining military support is also a poor
practice since the focus is on narcotics related activity. When such activity does not exist or when information
must be stretched to provide such a connection, ATF is subjected with either not obtaining military support or
being in danger of civil or criminal liability if information is fabricated or does not provide good probable cause.

          3. One person from the Texas Governor's office appeared to favor the use of National Guard assets
versus active duty military support. Through innuendo, there are appearances that he also hinted at the need
for narcotics relationship so that the support could be provided for free. I do not feel that this attitude served
ATF very well. For example, better imagery intelligence support could have been obtained from other Federal
law enforcement organizations or active military forces; armored vehicle support would have been more readily
available; smoke grenades might have been obtained if regular Fort Hood forces were used versus Special
Forces advisors; and the use of U.S. Customs Service helicopters would have provided better capabilities than
those supplied by the National Guard.

B. Air Operations:

          The decision not to use U. S. Customs helicopters ostensibly stemmed from a concern over OPSEC. I
am of the opinion that it was due more to interagency rivalry rather than OPSEC. The use of Customs
helicopters and crews offer several advantages to include communications capabilities not found on the National
Guard helicopters and the ability to fire from the helicopters.

C. Communications:

          1. There are many conflicting statements concerning the adequacy of communications and
communications support during the operation. At the very least, planning for communications shows a need for
improvement. Communications planning should help to ensure continuity of command and control and is
therefore closely linked to the adequacy of training and procedural guidance on command and control. Simply
stated, if one cannot or will not communicate, then command and control will not exist. For example, the
Tactical Coordinator appeared to be out of the command and control loop once the raid ran into difficulty. I was
not able to determine what the cause for this was.

          2. There are a large number of examples which point towards performance problems, planning
problems, potential training shortfalls, and a few possibilities of inadequate equipment. They include:

Linkages to local law enforcement and other supporting organizations were not outlined well in terms of net
control and communications responsibility or redundant communications links between ATF and these
organizations.

There appears to be confusion concerning who was to operate the open-line with ATF Headquarters and what
their duties were.

The Forward Observers were not able to communicate directly with the Tactical Coordinator nor the SRT
Leaders.

The Incident Commander was not effectively communicating from the helicopters to the Tactical Coordinator
nor to any other segment of the ATF operation. This was especially true when the helicopter he was on had to
land once it received fire from the ground.

Cavanaugh in the U/C House was not provided with sufficient communications personnel support to allow him
to control all the activities (e.g., crisis negotiations, control of the Forward Observers, control of the deployed
SRTs) which fell on his shoulders when the raid ran into difficulty.

The Forward Observers and other ATF personnel on the back side of the compound ran into communications
problems.

D. Medical:

          1. Overall medical planning and preparations were excellent. The Special Forces personnel appeared to
provide excellent assistance in planning and helping ATF personnel prepare and rehearse for medical
emergencies. One gap in the plan appears to be that mass casualty situations were not anticipated with no
plans in place to handle such a contingency. The contracted medical services could have been easily
overwhelmed if the Branch Davidians had attempted mass suicide. When faced with a well-armed or potentially
suicidal group, medical planning should consider mass casualty situations.

          2. Improvement opportunities for ATF exist in developing policy and procedures to ensure that
appropriate planning support is obtained or to develop an in-house capability for medical planning.

E. Media:

          1. ATF's problems with the media potentially began with the interview of Mark Breault who was
already in contact with the media: were exacerbated with the meetings and

discussions with the media prior to the raid; were compounded by the media being suspected of compromising
the raid on February 28th; and were further fueled by media relations in the aftermath of the raid.

2. I find four potential areas for improvement of ATF's media relations:

ATF personnel can benefit from strengthened media policy, publication of procedural guides for
media relations, and additional training. Many media situations are judgmental calls (e.g., Chojnacki
deciding to meet the media in Waco), so additional training based on coherent policy is a key to help ATF
personnel understand the potential risks and benefits of dealing with the media.

ATF ASACs and above should be prepared to accept press conference responsibilities or to ensure that
the ATF spokesperson is physically and emotionally prepared. I refer specifically to the poor judgement shown
by the use of Special Agent Wheeler as the spokesperson in the aftermath of the raid's failure when she had
not slept for a reported 36 hours.

ATF Headquarters should be prepared to augment field personnel on major operations which have the
potential to attract major media attention.

The Department of Treasury, in conjunction with Justice and the Congress, examine the potential of enacting
legislation to provide criminal penalties for willful and negligent acts contributing to the loss of life on law
enforcement or national security operations.

F. Coordination of Other Agencies:

          1. There are numerous indicators that ATF's preparations to coordinate their actions with other
agencies were less than optimal. They include:

The lack of a written operations order which would have provided specific instructions to ATF personnel to
coordinate the activities of other agencies while providing overall guidance to those agencies.

The failure to rapidly transfer the 911 call from the Branch Davidian compound to ATF control from
McClennan County.

The inordinate length of time required to get military armored vehicles on-scene.

The lack of instructions on pursuit of suspects that could have fled the compound.

          2. The appearances are that ATF personnel require additional training and procedural guidance to plan
large-scale operations which require close coordination with a variety of non-ATF organizations.

VII. WEAPONRY, ARMAMENT, and OTHER EQUIPMENT:

A. Automatic Weapons:

          1. The ATF SRT leaders do not feel that automatic weapons capability is a necessity. I recommend that
ATF review their current policy and consider the use of automatic weapons situationally. . .if the adversary has
full auto weapons, then ATF should have the capability to overcome these. The use of automatic weapons by a
criminal adversary could be overcome through ways other than using comparable weapons (e.g., better tactics,
use of vehicles for entry, explosive entry). The difficulty in such a strategy is that ATF personnel will have to
be much better trained to overcome a firepower deficiency.

B. Rifles (Assault and Forward Observer):

          1. There is a definite need for ATF to review their decision to limit the use of rifles. Sub-machine or
machine pistol type weapons simply do not have the range nor the accuracy inherent with longer barreled
weapons such as AR-15s or other assault rifles. One ATF report refers to accuracy of the MP5 weapon out to
300 meters, but that ignores the fact that rural and some urban operations may require longer shots. In
addition, the ability to penetrate some materials and to incapacitate a human is better with rifle rounds such as
the 5.56mm and 7.62mm than with 9mm ammunition. In addition, 7.62mm weapons should also be considered
since they can prove highly useful on vehicle stops and road blocks...not to mention longer range forward
observer shots.

          2. A number of SRT members raised questions over the availability of rifles to support their operations.
They question the ATF Headquarters proclamation that AR-15s will be phased out. Since these personnel are
the ones tasked with mission execution, it is my belief that they should have a greater say in what weaponry
they are allowed to use.

C. Suppressed Weapons:

          1. ATF personnel have not mentioned the potential need for suppressed weaponry on extremely
high-risk operations. Suppressed weapons are useful in a variety of situations and provide a means of providing
a critical edge to SRT-type units. There are a number of military and law enforcement organizations which
possess such weapons and have proved their ability to use them discriminately. ATF should consider their need
for such weapons if they are to continue with missions similar to the one they faced in Waco.

D. Chemical Munitions:

          1. ATF is limited by their own policy on the use of smoke and disabling chemical agents. Again, these
capabilities are found in a number of law enforcement and military organizations tasked with SRT type
activities and have been used discriminately by these organizations for years. The ability to use chemical
munitions can provide a needed advantage to

SRTs and can be used to lessen the chances of loss of life. For these reasons, ATF should reconsider their
policy on the use of chemical munitions.

E. Distraction devices:

          1. The use of distraction devices such as the commonly referred to "Flash Bang" are limited by ATF
policy. The policy requires that ATF personnel use a "peek and throw" philosophy on ALL operations. Such a
policy is extremely limiting and can result in additional danger to ATF personnel.

          2. ATF policy should be modified to allow the use of distraction devices other than through a "peek and
throw" technique. The policy and any accompanying procedural guidance should specify situations in which
exclusions from the "peek and throw" method are permissible. In addition, all SRTs within ATF should receive
training on the use of distraction devices.

F. Vehicles.

          1. Armored vehicles would have been highly useful in Waco for a variety of operations ranging from use
in recovering wounded, protecting personnel during retrograde movement, use in entry, etc. The fact that
armored vehicles were not available appears to be a significant planning oversight.

          2. ATF should qualify a number of their personnel on the use and operation of specified armored
vehicles to include use of on-board weapons systems such as machine-guns and smoke generators. The
procedures to obtain military support for these types of vehicles should be reviewed and solidified to ensure
their availability for operations similar to Waco in the future.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS: Throughout my report and analysis of information there has been a
continuing theme of:

-  The need for policy review and modification
-  Providing additional procedural guidance beyond policy documents to ATF personnel
-  A very definite need for improved training in a number of areas

Perhaps these sound overly redundant. I submit that it is only through sound policy, supported by additional
reference (i.e., procedural) materials, and thorough training that the tragedy which befell ATF at Waco can be
prevented in the future. These focus on system fixes rather than individual actions along with the development
of processes which provide a sound foundation for operational actions.
 
 
 
 

                              CURRICULUM VITAE FOR
                                   Wade Y. Ishimoto

        Education      M.A., Human Resources Development, Webster University
                       B.A., Asian Studies, University of Hawaii

        Professional   U.S. Army Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Course
        Schooling      U.S. Army Counterintelligence Agent's Course
                       U.S. Army Special Warfare Center Instructor Training Course
                       Numerous courses relating to intelligence, security, and special operations

        Current        Technical Manager, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM
        Occupation

        Instructional  University of New Mexico, Division of Continuing Education and
        Experience     Community Services, 1985-Present
                       U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, 1987-Present
                       U. S . Department of Energy Nuclear Emergency Search Team
                       courses, 1985-present
                       California Department of Justice Terrorism Course, 1984-1986
                       Delta Force Operator's Training Course, 1977-1982
                       University of Santa Clara, 1975- 1977
                       U. S. Army J.F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, 1973- 1975
                                                                                     Mobile Training Team special operations assignments to foreign, allied
                       military and law enforcement organizations
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Numerous instructional engagements with law enforcement organiza                                                                                                                                                                         tions
                       to include the Calgary Police Service, Royal Canadian Mounted
                       Police, Canada Security & Intelligence Service, Los Angeles Police
                       and Sheriffs Departments, Texas Narcotics Officers Association, and
                       the National Tactical Officer's Association, 1962-present

        Pertinent      Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) 1978-Present; founder of the
        Experience     NEST Training Management Working Group; project leader to reorganize
                       and restructure the organization in 1989; Exercise Director of several
                       Interagency (FBI, DOD, DOE, FEMA, local law enforcement) terrorist-
                       related national exercises; planner or participant in other NEST exercises;
                       developed a Key Leader Training Course.

                       Nuclear Security Systems Directorate 1985-1992, led numerous projects
                       related to high-threat security situations including a Defense Nuclear
                       Agency funded Insider Study, a Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear
                       Weapons Study involving overseas and domestic situations, documentation
                       of R&D requirements to support the TSWG for terrorist incidents; and
 
 
 

Curriculum Vitae for Wade Y. Ishimoto (continued)

Pertinent      participation on a U.S. Physical Protection Bi-Lateral Team to Korea and
Experience     Japan. Also performed liaison functions to various military special opera-
(continued)    tions organizations and the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team. Designed and
               implemented the construction of a new Emergency Operations Center
               for Sandia National Laboratories and revamped their emergency opera-
               tions program.

               Security and Intelligence Specialist, U.S. Department of Energy, 1984-85,
               Key member of a Tiger Team assigned to revamp emergency operations
               within the Albuquerque Operations Office complex which included over
               40,000 employees at six locations from Florida to New Mexico. Inspec-
               tion staff duties. Organized mobile training teams for special response
               team training.

               Vice-President for Operations, SAS of Texas, 1982-1984; led a White
               House directed examination of security preparations for the 1984 Summer
               Olympic Games in Los Angeles with over 2/3 of the recommendations
               being adopted; led security projects in support of the Nuclear Regulatory
               Commission, other governmental agencies, and private concerns.

               Delta Force, 1977-1982; Intelligence Officer leading the effort to automate
               terrorist information in a interagency data base; Team Leader on the 1980
               attempt to rescue 53 American hostages in Tehran; participant in several
               real-life counterterrorist operations; liaison and consulting duties to the
               FBI, Secret Service, Navy SEALS, overseas counterterrorist forces, and
               other special operations units.

               Other pertinent experience includes Special Forces assignments in the
               U.S., Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam (three tours)
               including training duties, exercise development, and combat operations;
               Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence collection duties in Korea,
               Hawaii, and the continental U.S.; and Military Police and investigative
               duties.
 
 
 
 
 

                 A Selective Analysis
                          of
                Operation Trojan Horse
                     Conducted by
     the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
 
 
 
 
 

                     Conducted by
 

      John A. Kolman, Captain (L.A.S.D. retired)
 
 
 

                    for the Staff
 

                        of the
              Waco Administrative Review
       United States Department of the Treasury
 
 
 

         TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                        Page
 

         EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          B-35
 

         Chapter                                                                                                               Page
 

                      1. THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF

                TERMS USED .............................................             B-39
                INTRODUCTION ...........................................             B-39
                   The BATF Special Response Team Program--
                      An Historical Overview ...........................             B-39
                   A Synopsis of Operation Trojan Horse ................             B-40

                THE PROBLEM ............................................             B-44
                   Statement of the Problem ............................             B-44
                   Limitations of the Project ..........................             B-44
                RESEARCH METHODS .......................................             B-44
                DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED ..........................      B-45
                   OPSEC ...............................................    B-45

                   TEMS ................................................    B-45

                   Dynamic Entry .......................................       B-45

                  T.S.T.C./T.S.T.I. ...................................    B-45
 
 

           2. ANALYSIS .............................................    B-46
                 PLANNING AND PREPARATION ..........................     B-46
                   Tactical Alternatives ...............................           B-46

                   Tactics and Related Matters .........................             B-50

                   Logistics ...........................................             B-53

                   Emergency Medical Service ...........................             B-54
 
 

        Communications ......................................                        B-56

        Intelligence Function ...............................                        B-57

        Briefing ............................................                        B-60
        Training/Rehearsal ..................................                        B-61
      COMMAND AND CONTROL ...................................                        B-63
        Decisions Impacting the Operation ...................                        B-63
        Organization and Structure ..........................                        B-66
      OPERATIONS SECURITY ...................................                        B-70
      MEDIA INVOLVEMENT .....................................                        B-73
 

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................                        B-76

      CONCLUSIONS ...........................................                        B-76

      RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................                        B-77
 
 

   REFERENCES ...............................................                        B-80
 

                                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
 
 

        The attempted service of search/arrest warrants by agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) on February 28, 1993, at the Branch Davidian Compound near Waco, Texas, was, in all probability,
unprecedented within American law enforcement. Although many agencies (Federal, state and local) have conducted
countless major high-risk warrant operations involving heavily armed multiple suspects, within the experience of
the evaluator, none have rivaled the weaponry and fervent opposition which confronted the brave men and women
of the BATF during Operation Trojan Horse. Certainly none have resulted in the tragic loss and wounding of so
many law enforcement officers.
 

        The purpose of objectively analyzing this or any other tactical incident is not to castigate or condemn, but
rather to learn from what occurred with a view toward future improvement. The loss of Steven Willis, Robert
Williams, Conway LeBleu, and Todd McKeehan, and the wounding of numerous other dedicated agents, make it
essential that an objective evaluation be conducted.
 

        The purpose of this project was: (1) to conduct a selective analysis of the planning, preparation, and
subsequent attempted service of search/arrest warrants on February 28, 1993, by BATF personnel at the Branch
Davidian Compound, (2) to develop conclusions based upon the analysis of BATF efforts in this regard, and (3) to
make recommendations related to possible future operational improvements.
 

        This project relied upon an extensive review of numerous documents, reports, videotapes, and training
curricula provided by Waco Administrative Review staff; personal monitoring of Congressional hearings on June
9 and 10, 1993; personal interviews of selected BATF personnel; a review of the limited literature available in this
subject area; personal observation of the areas surrounding the Branch Davidian Compound, as well as the
Command Post, undercover residence, and Staging Areas; personal knowledge of contemporary policy, procedure
and training within the tactical community; and extensive personal experience within the field of law enforcement
tactical operations.

                                      B-35

The results of this analysis are believed to support the following conclusions:
 

1. BATF personnel involved in planning Operation Trojan Horse were dedicated, experienced law enforcement
professionals.
2. Much time and effort was expended in planning and preparing for Operation Trojan Horse.
3. Planners relied upon and trusted intelligence information which, in many cases, lacked corroboration.
4. A lack of knowledge existed on the part of both command and operational personnel concerning the proper
utilization and deployment of countersniper (Forward Observer Team) personnel.
Insufficient attention was directed by command personnel to the Operations Security (OPSEC) process.
6. There was an apparent lack of supervision over the intelligence gathering mechanism in terms of direction,
coordination, corroboration, dissemination and control.
7. Though well intentioned, contacts initiated by command personnel with the Waco Tribune-Herald violated
basic principles of operations security.
8. No media contacts should have been initiated by BATF before the operation's conclusion.
9. Command personnel lacked experience and training in directing major tactical operations.
10. The Incident Commander should have been located at the designated command post to facilitate communication
and control.
11. Once information had been received and corroborated that the operation had been compromised through the
loss of surprise, command personnel should have aborted the mission.
12. There was no planned alternative course of action to be taken if the mission was aborted.
13. Following the negotiation of a cease fire to remove and evacuate the dead and wounded, perimeter positions
should not have been abandoned until relief

                                      B-36

personnel had assumed them.
14. Had the operation not been compromised, there was a high probability that the tactical plan would have
succeeded.
15. Sufficient oversight was exercised by BATF Headquarters during all phases of Operation Trojan Horse.
16. Numerous acts of heroism were displayed by the men and women of the BATF during, and subsequent to, the
extensive firefight with the Branch Davidians.

        These conclusions, and others of less significance, contained within the body of the full report, constitute
justification for considering the following recommendations.

1. Assign personnel to command positions (Incident Commander, Tactical Coordinator, Deputy Tactical Coordinator)
based upon qualifications--not rank or position.
2. Develop and provide tactical crisis management training for those assigned to these positions.
3. Explore the feasibility of selecting and training an on-call cadre of personnel with proven decision-making and
leadership ability to assume the roles of Incident Commander and Tactical Coordinator.
4. Ensure that all command and supervisory personnel understand their joint responsibility to abort an operation
if circumstances justify doing so.
5. Increase the training time of Division Special Response Teams to a minimum of twice a month.
6. Explore the feasibility of establishing regional, full-time Special Response Teams for deployment during major
operations.
7. Review and modify, as necessary, the criteria for selecting Special Response Team members.
8. Review and modify, as necessary, the curriculum of Special Response Team training.
9. Establish a Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS) program and formally assign EMS-trained personnel
to each Special Response Team.

                                      B-37

10. Develop and implement a hostage negotiation program as an integral part of Special Response Team operations.
11. Evaluate existing Special Response Team equipment based on contemporary standards within the tactical
community (to include chemical agents).
12. Review the organization, structure, and functions of the Technology and Tactical Issues Committee to ensure
the timely evaluation and approval of tactical equipment and procedures.
13. Conduct meetings, at least annually, of Federal special operations team leaders and command personnel (BATF,
FBI, Marshals, Customs) to discuss past tactical analyses and contemporary procedures. Emphasize necessity for
interagency cooperation and training.
14. Ensure familiarity with guidelines related to requesting and utilizing air support.
15. Review and modify, as necessary, OPSEC training for all command and operational personnel.
16. Review and modify the media notification process.
17. Review and modify the BATF National Response Plan.
18. Pursue legislation enabling electronic surveillance and monitoring under circumstances such as existed at the
Branch Davidian Compound.
19. Empanel a committee comprised of representatives from affected BATF entities to review these and other
recommendations made by the Tactical Advisory Expert Panel.
 

        In spite of extensive planning and preparation by well-intentioned, experienced agents, success was not
achieved at the Branch Davidian Compound. It eluded them, not because of a lack of ability or resources, but rather
deficiencies in policy and procedure, which were exposed by the magnitude of the situation.

        Prior operations conducted by BATF Special Response Teams (433 in the past two years) apparently failed
to reveal these deficiencies, due to their varying circumstances, as well as the reduced size of many of the
operations.

Chapter 1

                    THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
 

                                  INTRODUCTION

         The BATF Special Response Team Program--An Historical Overview
 
 

        In recent years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) responsibility to enforce Federal
firearms, explosives, and arson statutes has met with increasing resistance from those individuals and groups
involved in these activities (10). Because of the nature of these laws, almost every arrest or search warrant
executed by the BATF involves armed suspects.

        Accordingly, in 1989, after reviewing the Bureau's capabilities and limitations in managing these incidents,
each of the twenty-two Field Divisions were authorized to form what were then called high-risk entry control
teams. These teams, comprised of specially selected volunteers, initially made use of available state and local
training resources within their particular areas. However, in 1991, a decision was made to develop a centralized
training program in order to ensure uniformity and the ability of agents to meet required physical fitness standards.
Ultimately, Fort McClellan, Alabama, home of the U.S. Army's military police, chemical, and special response team
training schools, was selected as the site of the basic two-week BATF Special Response Team (SRT) training
program. Each Field Divisions team is now required to attend this rigorous course.

        The live-in program, consists of approximately 130 hours of training over a 10 day period, and places heavy
emphasis on promoting teamwork. Subject areas vary from building entry and tactics to firearms training, trauma
aid, operational planning, and physical conditioning. A high instructor-to-student ratio of one per two is maintained
during training to enhance the learning process and enable appropriate performance evaluation (9:38). Instructors
are selected based upon their background and experience. Over one half of the instructional cadre have past
pertinent military experience, and one third are former members of law enforcement tactical units.

        Following successful completion of the basic program at Fort McClellan, each team is required to train a
minimum of 24 hours each quarter. Much of this training is conducted in conjunction with area state and local
SWAT teams. Special Response Team members are equipped with the best tactical safety equipment available,
including body

armor, ballistic shields, firearms, and communications equipment.

        Since their inception, the Special Response Teams have actively proven their worth. During the past two
fiscal years, BATF SRTs were activated 433 times to resolve cases determined to be the most dangerous (10).
These activations varied from assisting at the scene of the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, to providing assistance in
capturing murder suspects in Idaho that same year.
 

        Significantly, until Operation Trojan Horse on February 28, 1993, only one SRT member had been injured
by gunfire (10).

                      A Synopsis of Operation Trojan Horse
 

        The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms officially became aware of the Branch Davidians and David
Koresh on June 4, 1992. This awareness resulted from a referral by the McLennan County Sheriff to the Austin
ATF Office. Additional referrals of complaint were received from a Congressman, the U.S. Attorneys Office, and
the media. These complaints basically addressed allegations of sexual abuse by David Koresh, as well as firearms
violations. Concern was also expressed over why nothing had been done by the authorities to alleviate the problem.
As a result of this information, a case agent was assigned, and an extensive investigation initiated to determine if
violations of laws enforceable by BATF were occurring. Information related to probable cause was later presented
to the Assistant U.S. Attorney, who expressed the belief that there was sufficient information for a search warrant
based upon the purchase of firearms and items necessary to convert them to fire in full automatic mode.

        The continuing investigation next placed emphasis on linking Koresh's purchases of chemicals with the
manufacture of explosive devices. Because of the sensitive nature of the investigation, activities were closely
monitored by BATF Headquarters. In anticipation of obtaining search and arrest warrants, operational planning
commenced in December, 1992. Numerous planning meetings were conducted, and after extensive discussion,
focused on utilizing three Special Response Teams with support personnel to effect service of the warrants.

        Although many options were explored by planners (i.e., siege [contain and call out], luring Koresh away from
the Compound, doing nothing, etc.), for reasons that will be addressed later in this report, a dynamic raid of the
Compound, using helicopters as a diversion, was agreed upon. As a result of intelligence gathered from the
continuing investigation, which included undercover operations at and in the vicinity of the Compound, and selected
interviews of disillusioned former cult members, a plan was finalized and approved.

        The plan called for the raid to be initiated at approximately 1000 hours on a date to be specified. This time
was selected because, according to intelligence sources, following Bible study, the men of the Compound would be
outside working on a construction project and separated from their weapons, which were kept in a storeroom on
the second floor of the Compound adjacent to Koresh's living quarters. Women and children would reportedly be
studying the Bible or involved with chores. Containment (cover) personnel would be responsible for isolating and
securing the men at the construction site, or anyone outside the structure. One SRT team would secure men on
the first floor, and another would isolate and secure women and children on the second floor and clear the towers.
Lastly, a third team would secure the second floor weapons room and arrest David Koresh.

        It was recognized early on that it would be difficult to approach the Compound undetected because of the
terrain and remoteness of the area. Therefore, planners opted to use two pickup trucks and cattle trailers to
transport the raid force to the Compound. These vehicles were known to be very common to the area, and
consequently would not cause alarm or suspicion if driven in the vicinity of the Branch Davidian Compound.
Surprise and speed of execution were believed critical to achieve success. As the raid force arrived at the front of
the Compound, three Texas National Guard helicopters would arrive shortly before, some distance to the
northwest. The presence of helicopters would hopefully attract the attention of the men working at the rear of the
Compound and mask the arrival of the raid force. Once the Branch Davidians and the Compound were secure,
support personnel would handle arrestees and search for and process evidence. A search warrant for a second
location associated with the Compound, referred to as the "Mag Bag", was to be served simultaneously. This location
was a screening point for UPS deliveries destined for the Compound, and was manned by cult members.
Undoubtedly, it also functioned as an early warning system for the Compound.

        The operational plan provided for the assignment of ATF Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel to
each Special Response Team. Medivac helicopters would be on standby at the Command Post, and an ambulance
and crew would be staged at a roadblock position. Unfortunately, it would not be possible for civilian EMS
personnel and ambulances to accompany the raid force to the Compound because of the potential hazard, as well
as the fact that their presence would alert the Compound to the impending warrant service. Contingency plans
provided for the mission to be aborted at any time after the raid force left the Staging Area, but prior to the
vehicles turning into the Compound. The abort decision would be based upon continuous surveillance of the location
from an undercover site.

        In late 1992, BATF became aware of local media interest in the Branch Davidians and David Koresh.
Specifically, the Waco Tribune-Herald was preparing a

series of articles on the cult and its leader. Concerned that any article of this nature might cause Koresh to become
more alert and paranoid about possible law enforcement action against him, and prompt an increase of curious
onlookers in the area, an ATF representative contacted the paper in an effort to delay publication of the series until
after March 1, 1993. These and subsequent negotiations with the newspaper concerning this issue were fruitless.
BATF representatives were told that the series would begin as soon as it was complete. Eventually, they were
advised on February 26, 1993, that the first article in the series would be released on February 27, two days before
BATF planned to serve the warrants. At this point, support personnel and equipment had already arrived in the
Waco area, and Special Response Teams, along with selected support personnel, were rehearsing and training for
the operation at Fort Hood, Texas. Consequently, it was decided to advance the scheduled date of execution by
one day to February 28, 1993. The final decision would be kept in abeyance until David Koresh's reaction to the
first article could be assessed through undercover contacts. These contacts revealed n